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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: D\VIGHrr L. KING No. F-39 
Petition for Rehearing 
Petitioner in the above-entitled matter hereby peti-
tions this Honorable Court for a rehearing of the review 
by this Court of the recommendations of the Board of 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, and in support of 
said petition, states as follows: 
1. The Court, in its opinion, overlooked certain ma-
terial matters which have a direct bearing on the decision. 
2. The Court failed to consider and properly apply 
the Canons of Ethics of the Utah State Bar and has neg-
lected to consider the Statutes of the State of Utah, spe-
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cifically Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-51-26, 
Subsections 4 and 5. 
3. The Court failed to apply the proper principles of 
law relating to the quantum of proof necessary to estab-
lish the alleged unprofessional conduct of the accused. 
4. The Court failed to consider the severity of the 
punishment in the light of all facts and circumstances of 
this case and particularly the conflicting duties and 
dilemma created by the Canons of Ethics of the Utah 
State Bar and the Statutes of the State of Utah. 
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that this Honor-
able Court grant a rehearing in the above-entitled mat-
ter so that the material oversights and failures revealed 
by the decision heretofore filed may be corrected and the 
ends of justice accomplished. 
DATED this 22nd day of April, 1958. 
~-~ 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
of NIELSEN AND CONDER 
510 N ehouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
A careful examination of the opinion of the Court 
reveals what petitioner considers to be several basic mis-
understandings by the Court concerning the facts and the 
legal issues involved. These matters have been segregated 
into four main topics for discussion, with some sub-topics, 
as follows: 
I. l\1a terial rna tters having a direct bearing on the 
case which \Vere apparently overlooked by the 
Court. 
A. Alleged change of position by petitioner. 
B. Alleged failure of petitioner to disclose false 
testimony until June 21st. 
C. The false testimony was on an immaterial 
matter. 
II. Application of the Canons of Ethics and Statutes 
of Utah to the instant matter. 
III. Incorrect application by the Court of the law re-
lating to burden of proof. 
IV. Severity of the punishment in the light of all the 
facts and circumstances. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
-yrATERIAL l\IA TTERS HAVING A DIRECT 
BEARING ON THE CASE WHICH WERE 
APPARENTLY OVERLOOKED BY THE 
COURT. 
A. ALLEGED CHANGE OF POSITION 
BY PETITIONER. 
rrhe Court states in its opinion that petitioner 
• 'changed his position somewhat'' by asserting, when 
first investigated, that he considered his duty to his client 
to be greater than his duty to the Court to disclose the 
false statement and then later at the hearing claimed that 
he intended at the first opportunity to disclose the false 
statement of his client. 
This Court, in making such an observation has appar-
ently failed to take into account that petitioner was talk-
ing in reference to different matters so that his position 
in this case has not changed. Originally, petitioner was 
charged with "knowingly permitting witnesses to fabri-
cate evidence and testify falsely before the District Court 
of Davis County." (R. 9). The disciplinary committee 
subsequently at the hearing amended its complaint to 
include an alleged additional offense of ''knowingly re-
fraining from divulging the truth to the Court or parties 
eo11eerning such evidence and testimony.'' (R. 16) 
The findings of the disciplinary committee did not 
sw~tn in PitlH.'r of the charged grounds. Paragraph Y of 
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the disciplinary committee's findings were only that pe-
titioner ''did not disclose to the Court or to other coun-
sel true facts as to the place and dates of the execution of 
such Waiver of Notice of Directors and Resolution of 
Harsh Utah Corporation until June 21, 1954, at a time 
when said defendants begin their case in chief at such 
trial although Dwight L. I{ing, as Counsel, had opportu-
nity to do so." (R. 280) 
The claim that Petitioner knowingly permitted others 
to fabricate evidence apparently was abandoned after the 
hearing on the matter. As a matter of fact, the Waiver 
and Resolution were both proper documents for the offi-
cers of Harsh F tah Corporation to prepare. There is no 
evidence that these documents do not now constitute a 
part of the official record of the corporation, and so, are 
not fabricated or false documents. 
It is respectfully submitted that it must be kept in 
mind that the only offense \Yhich the disciplinary com-
mittee found petitioner guilty of was not divulging the 
true facts before the 21st day of June, 1954, although 
opportunity v,ras present to do so. 
\Vhen the disciplinary committee added the second 
clause of its charge it then became incumbent upon pe-
tioner to meet the assertion that he had not disclosed 
the false testimony which originally he was under inYes-
tigation for allegedly assisting in preparing and pre-
senting false false testimony to the Court. When the 
Findings of Fact were finally drawn it then became 
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incumbent upon petitioner to show that he made a dis-
closure within a reasonable time. 
The facts concerinng the occurrences, both in Davis 
County and in the office of petitioner have never been, in 
any way, varied nor has there been any change whatso-
ever in the testimony of the witnesses presented by 
petitioner. 
Rule 41 of the Canon of Ethics required petitioner 
to advise his client, Schnitzer, and the witness, Hutchin-
son, to rectify the false statement which they made under 
oath. The evidence that he did this is uncontradicted. 
The second requirement of Rule 41 requires the coun-
sel to advise the Court, or opposing party, of the false 
testimony so that any benefit of the false testimony would 
be given up. 
rrhis Court has heretofore determined specifically 
that the false statements of both Hutchinson and 
Schnitzer were immaterial to any issue in the case. So, 
even if the witnesses, Schnitzer and Hutchinson, had re-
fused to rectify the false statements the only other re-
quirement would have been that petitioner inform the 
injured person or counsel and any advantage obtained 
would then be given up. No advantage could possibly be 
obtained by false testimony on an immaterial matter. 
The second requirement of Rule 41, it would seem, is not 
<lllplicable. 
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This Court, in State Y. Hutchinson, 4 U 2d. 404, 295 
P. 2d. 345, at page 406, concerning the false testimony 
of Hutchinson and Schnitzer, stated as follows: 
''They reasoned well since the trial court 
found the statements to have been on immaterial 
matter with 'vhich conclusion we agree." 
B. ALLEGED FAILURE OF PETITION-
ER TO DISCLOSE FALSE TESrri-
MONY UNTIL JUNE 21st. 
On page 2 of the Opinion of the Court it is stated: 
'' rrhere "·as no effort to disclose false testi-
mony on the next Court day which was the fol-
lowing _l\Ionday, nor on Tuesday, Wednesday, 
Thursday or Friday of that week." 
This statement is not accurate, nor does it fairl~· 
interpret the evidence which is undisputed. 
On June 16th the Court Reporter, J. L. Mays, took 
over the reporting duties in the trial of the Harsh Utah 
case. Mr. j[ays reported only the 16th and 17th of June, 
1954. The 17th of J nne was the Thursday referred to in 
the quoted portion of the Court's opinion. On Thursday, 
the witness Goddard had taken the stand and Sherman 
began to examine him. At that time, the petitioner at-
tempted to stipulate into the record, and did get a partial 
stipulation into the record, concerning the false testimony 
of Hutchinson and Schnitzer. (Exhibit No. P 2, F. 39, 
Page 224.) rrhe attempted stipulation shows the effort of 
petitioner to state fairly that the resolution and waiver 
were prepared in his office by his secretary upon the 
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dictation of IIutchinson. It was refused by Sherman 
unless petitioner would stipulate that l\Ir. Black and he 
v:ere both participants in the preparation of the Waiver 
and the Minute. Since such was not the fact an agreeable 
stipulation was not made. The statement of Mr. Sherman 
indicates that he was not concerned about proving that 
the testimony of Schnitzer and Hutchinson was false but 
his main purpose was to implicate both Counsel Black 
and petitioner in some alleged improper conduct regard-
ing the matter. He said: 
''I will continue the examination for the pur-
pose of the record. I would prefer to have it testi-
fied to." (Exhibit Xo. P 2 F. 39, page 224.) 
The attempted stipulation on June 17th constituted 
an effort by petitioner to disclose the facts and it was 
completely effective in that it revealed the fact that the 
documents had not been prepared in Oregon and could 
not, therefore, have been signed at the time Schnitzer and 
Hutchinson testified that they were signed. 
Even though Counsel for the opposition refused to 
allow Petitioner to stipulate the facts on June 17th, 
Petitioner caused a complete disclosure of all the facts 
surrounding the false testimony to be made on the 21st 
day of June when both Schnitzer and Hutchinson testi-
fied and withdrew their false statements. The attempted 
stipulation on June 17th \Yas an effort by petitioner to 
reveal to counsel and the Court that both Hutchinson and 
Schnih~er had testified falsely when they stated that the 
Resolution and l\1:inute were prepared in Portland and 
were sig-11<-'d on April 1st, 1953. 
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Counsel for the Bar Association in their brief at-
tempt to discredit the actions of petitioner by claiming 
that petitioner misrepresented the facts. Actually, as 
petitioner stated, he did not remember when the docu-
ments were prepared; but the Court Reporter's tran-
script which records petitioner as stating that the parties 
''left'' the office to prepare the documents is an incorrect 
reporting of what petitioner said. It is obvious that this 
is an error of the reporter since the transcript further 
records petitioner as having stated he knew his stenog-
rapter ·was being used to type up the material. Surely 
he would not have attempted to claim that Schnitzer and 
Hutchinson left the office with the stenographer and later 
returned. In the light of the other statements contained 
in the record, the only reasonable conclusion to be reached 
is that petitioner stated the parties "went to" his office, 
rather than ''left.'' 
The Court, in its decision, places great emphasis on 
the number of days which passed before any effort was 
made. The amount of time which elapsed between the 
false statements and the attempted disclosure of the same 
was 7 days, not 11, as stated in the Court's opinion. And 
within that 7 days there was a weekend, so that there were 
only 5 days of trial time lapsed between the time of the 
false testimony and its disclosure by petitioner. 
C. THE FALSE TESTI1IONY WAS ON 
AN L\I.l\IATERIAL l\1ATTER. 
Throughout the Court's opinion the testimony of 
Schnitzer and Hutchinson is repeatedly referred to as 
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perjury. At no place in the majority op1n1on does the 
Court state that the perjury was second degree, or dis-
close that the perjury was on an immaterial matter. 
Apparently the Court has overlooked this particular 
aspect of the case. The immateriality of the testimony is 
now conclusively determined, since this Court, in the case 
of State v. I-Iutchinson, supra, determined that the false 
statements were on immaterial matters. 
Petitioner feels that this failure of the Court's opin-
ion to state in unequivocal language the basic fact that the 
perjury committed was second degree and on an imma-
terial rna tter may be one of the explanations why the 
Court did not give the matter of punishment more 
consideration. 
Another evidence that the immaterial aspect of 
the testimony has been overlooked by the Court is found 
in the only quoted authority of the main opinion. Thorn-
ton, on "Attorneys At Law," Volume 2, page 1235, Sec-
tion 1822. The quoted statement is applicable only where 
an attorney finds that his case is being supported by 
perjured testimony. Petitioner ·s case was not being sup-
ported by perjured testimony in any way. 
The fact that the testimony was on an immaterial 
matter has a definite bearing on the action taken by 
petitioner. Only by recognizing that no harm or preju-
dice resulted to anyone by reason of the false statements 
of Hutchinson and Schnitzer, can a true perspective of 
the action of petitioner be gained. 
10 
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Throughout the record, and in the original complaint 
filed, complainant Sherman accused petitioner of fab-
ricating evidence and participating in the preparation of 
false testimony and false documents. On the witness stand 
he stated that he had been informed that Schnitzer was 
perjuring himself indiscriminately in the litigation. There 
was no evidence of any perjury on material or immaterial 
matters other than the single instance which is the sub-
ject matter of this proceeding. 
It would appear, that Sherman, equipped as he was 
with his means of eavesdropping during the off Court 
hours, and cross-examining during the Court hours, 
would uncover any type of false statements, falsification, 
or fabrication of documents. Certainly, with his aggres-
sive attitude toward both the opposing parties and their 
counsel, any false statements or documents he discovered 
would have been made known to the Court. 
PoiNT II. 
APPLICATION OF THE CANONS OF ETHICS 
AND STATUTES OF UTAH TO THE IN-
STANT :\IATTER. 
The opinion of the Court does not, at any place, dis-
cuss the several rules of conduct for attorneys, which 
appear to be inconsistent with each other, nor does the 
opinion in any way discuss the dilemma into which peti-
tioner was placed by the examination (by Mr. Sherman) 
of the party Schnitzer and the witness Hutchinson. 
11 
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While the court may have considered petitioner was 
in a dilemma, it does not appear to have been given any 
consideration in the opinion. 
The provisions of the rules of conduct, attorneys' 
oaths, the statutes of the State of Utah, under circum-
stances shown by the evidence here, place an attorney in 
a dilemma, the solution to which it is respectfully sub-
mitted is not as simple as the decision of the Court 
indicates. 
The attorney's oath contains the following promises 
by a counselor at law. This oath is required upon admis-
sion to the Bar of the State of Utah: 
''I will employ for the purpose of maintain-
ing the causes confided to me such means only as 
are consistent with truth and honor and will never 
seek to mislead the Judge or Jury by any artifice 
or false statement of fact or law.'' 
''I will maintain the confidence and preserve 
inviolate the secrets of my client and will accept 
no compensation in connection with his business 
except only with his knowledge and approval." 
(Exhibit P-7) 
Sec. 78-51-26, U.C.A., sets forth the contrasting 
duties of an attorney in the following language: 
'' 4 ( 4). To employ for the purposes of main-
taining the ea n~c~ confided to him such means only 
as are consistent with truth and never to seek to 
mislead thP judges hy any artifice or false state-
nwut of fact or la\Y. 
12 
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'' 3. To maintain inviolate the confidences 
and at every peril to himself to preserve the 
secrets of his client." 
rrhe Canons of Ethics which set up and delineate 
the conflicts under which a lawyer labors are as follows: 
No. 6, 15, 22, 29, 32, 37 and 41. Stated succinctly, these 
canons seem to require of the lawyer that he at all times 
maintain the confidential communications of his client 
and at the same time extend to the Courts of Law full 
candor and fairness. 
In the day-to-day practice of law there are numer-
ous situations which arise where the conflicting loyalties 
of an attorney are the subject of serious concern. Canons 
36 and 37 require the attorney to maintain absolute loy-
alty to his client and to preserve his confidences with-
out fear of any kind as to the consequences to himself. 
Canons 15, 22, 29, 32 and 41 require that the lawyer reveal 
to the Court any fraud, chicane or false testimony which 
is submitted in the course of litigation. 
This Court has determined that under the facts and 
circumstances of this case as outlined in the decision of 
the Court the duty of petitioner to the Court was para-
mount to his duty to the client. To this determination 
petitioner cannot in any way object, but it is respectfully 
submitted that the determination by the Court concern-
ing the primary duty of petitioner does not mean that the 
primary duty was so clear, unequivocal, or free from 
doubt at the time of the trial in Davis County. 
13 
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The American Bar Association has rendered opin-
ions regarding similar problems which have been pre-
sented to the Committee on Professional Ethics and 
Grievances of the American Bar Association by Commit-
tees of the State and Local Bar Association. The opinion 
most directly in point on the dilemma which faced peti-
tioner is Opinion No. 287, at page 609 of the American 
Bar Association Canons of Professional and Judicial 
Ethics, Opinions of Committee on Professional Ethics 
and Grievance, 1957. The opinion is dated the 27th of 
June, 1953, and is entitled: ''Confidential Communica-
tions, Candor and Fairness to the Court- Duty of Law-
yer on learning of client's perjury in litigation conducted 
by him. Conflicting Loyalties under Canons 6 and 37 and 
under Canons 15, 22, 29, 32 and 41. '' 
The various Canons above mentioned by the Ameri-
can Bar Association opinion are similar in text to the 
Canons of the Utah Bar Association as set forth in the 
Revised Rules of Utah Bar governing professional con-
duct and discipline. The numbers correspond to theRe-
vised Rules numbers and, as a consequence, the opinions 
are directly in point on the problem which confronted pe-
titioner. Two factual situations are considered, one -where 
the attorneys involved learned of the perjury of his client 
sometime after the commission of the perjury. The other 
fact situation concerned false statements (made in the 
presence of the lawyer) by his client to the Court and 
\\·hieh, at the time of the making, the attorney knew 
vven' false. The Committee on Professional Ethics and 
Grievances determined h~· its majorty opinion that the 
14 
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duty of the attorney was to respect the confidence of his 
client and not to divulge the confidential communica-
tion or the confidential information which he had re-
ceived. The opinion of the majority was concurred in, in 
part, and dissented from, in part, by one of the members 
of the committee and a dissenting opinion was written 
by three members of the Committee. The majority opin-
ion was concurred in by four of the Committee members. 
The opinion of this Court is, it is respectfully sub-
mitted, similar to the opinion of the minority of the Com-
mittee. This Court, in effect, follows the minority opin-
ion of the Committee on Professional Ethics. 
The close split between the members of the committee 
indicates that the solution to the question of what an 
attorney's duty is when a false statement is made by a 
client, is not clear or free from doubt. 
It is respectfully submitted that an attorney adopting 
the majority opinion of the Committee should not be 
found to have violated professional ethics. He chose to 
keep the confidence of his client rather than adopt the 
other horn of the dilemma and immediately disclose the 
false testimony amounting to perjury in the second 
degree. 
The concept of the immediate duty adopted by peti-
tioner is one which is greatly valued in our democratic so-
ciety. See Communists' Slavery vs. Individual Freedom-
an address by Charles S. Rhyne, President of the Amer-
ican Bar Association, given on December lOth, 1957, and 
15 
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quoted in full in the Utah Bar Bulletin for November and 
December, 1957. Mr. Rhyne states, in his address, as 
follows: 
''Behind the iron curtain we find the most 
shocking record in all World history of wholesale 
systematic denial, suppression and destruction of 
human rights of the individual. In fact, the aver-
age citizen, in communist-controlled states, has 
few rights. Those he does have are often violated. 
Soviet lawyers owe their first duty to the state, not 
to their client." (Page 159) 
At another point, Mr. Rhyne states as follows: 
"The rules of collectives lay down the law-
yer's obligation in conducting the defense of the 
client. They bluntly stress the fact that his first 
obligation is to the State, not the client. During a 
criminal trial the defense lawyer is duty bound to 
help the prosecution bring out adverse points 
against his client." (P. 161) 
These quotes, in this brief, are cited for the purpose 
of demonstrating to the Court that the choice between the 
duty to the Court and the duty to the client is not one which 
is easily made or free from doubt. Certainly, petitioner 
should not be punished because he honestly conceives his 
immediate duty to his client is paramount to his duty to 
the Court - even though this Court now holds that he 
was in error in so doing. 
16 
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PoiNT III. 
INCORRECT APPLICATION BY THE COURT 
OF THE LAW RELATING TO BURDEN OF 
PROOF. 
The Court, in its opinion, states as follows: 
'' * * * and we are not convinced by any clear 
evidence in the record that there was entire good 
faith exercised when the disclosure came after, 
not before, the falsifiers were caught and exposed, 
some 11 days after the perjury and one court day 
after it was clearly shown they had perjured 
themselves.'' 
As has been demonstrated, the petitioner made an 
effort to disclose the false statements five court days 
after they were made, so in this respect, the opinion is in 
error. 
A more serious objection to the above statement is 
that the Court has shifted the burden to the petitioner 
to present clear evidence which convinces it of his good 
faith. 
Of similar import is the weight given by the Court to 
the fact that "The matter has been heard by an investi-
gating committee of five, a disciplinary committee of three 
and a Board of Commissioners of seven, and there ap-
pears to have been no dissent voiced nor any minority 
report of any kind filed which would indicate that those 
hearing the matter did not join in a unanimous conclusion 
that disciplinary action was called for in this case." 
The Court appears influenced by this situation notwith-
17 
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standing the provisions of the Statute which put the re-
sponsibility upon this Court to determine the guilt or 
innocence of the attorney involved. Under Section 78-51-
18, U.C.A.1953, the Board of Bar Commissioners can only 
make recommendations to this Court. Under the provi-
sions of Section 78-51-19, the Supreme Court has the sole 
responsibility of finally determining the unprofessional 
conduct, if any, of a member of the Bar. Surely it is a 
fundamental principle of our government that no person 
stands convicted because of suspicion or for failure to 
exonerate himself from accusation. In this case Peti-
tioner was accused of assisting in the fabrication of false 
testimony. This charge was not sustained, but along the 
course of prosecution someone else conceived the idea that 
he might be guilty of failing to divulge to the Court that 
persons had committed perjury, and he was finally found 
guilty of failing to disclose such facts ''within a reason-
able time.'' Does this history of the prosecution of this 
case demonstrate the unanimity of thinking which this 
Court states manifestly appeared to the investigating 
committee, hearing committee, and Bar Commission' 
Petitioner further desires to point out to the Court 
that the report of the original investigating committee 
apparently adopted the same philosophy that this Court 
adopted when it recommended prosecution because it felt 
Mr. King's "explanation is not entirely satisfactory" 
(R. 6). If under our democratic processes a person is 
to ht• adjudged guilt~, of misconduct because he fails satis-
faetorily to explain the same when accused by another 
18 
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then indeed we are in danger of losing our civil liberties 
and our way of life is in jeopardy. 
If, as appears from the record, the original investi-
gating committee recommended prosecution of the case 
because petitioner failed satisfactorily to explain his con-
duct regarding the preparation of the documents in ques-
tion; if the prosecuting committee after endeavoring to 
sustain the original charge found it necessary to amend 
the complaint because of insufficiency of proof to support 
the original charge; if the hearing committee, which did 
not agree with either the investigating committee or the 
prosecuting committee felt petitioner had not disclosed 
the perjury timely to the Court but didn't want the re-
sponsibility of prescribing any punishment; if the State 
Bar Commission thereafter adopted such finding and rec-
ommended disciplinary action in order to support the 
action of the hearing committee and because the ultimate 
responsibility for final determination was with this Court 
then and in such event this Court, by giving weight to the 
actions of those who were appointed to seek out the facts, 
has inadvertently caused an injustice to be done not only 
to petitioner but to the orderly process of the law. 
POINT IV. 
SEVERITY OF THE PUNISHMENT IN THE 
LIGHT OF ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUM-
STANCES. 
Finally, petitioner respectfully submits that should 
this Court refuse to reconsider its decision it should nev-
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ertheless reduce the punishment which the Bar Associa-
tion recommended and which this Court has ordered be-
cause under all the facts and circumstances attendant in 
this case, such punishment is excessive. In the first in-
stance it must be remembered that since the false testi-
mony and the document themselves were immaterial to 
any issue in the litigation the disclosure of such falsity 
would have had no beneficial effect and its concealment 
would have had no detrimental effect on the action. Pe-
titioner's explanation that he avoided an immediate dis-
closure because of his desire to avoid, if possible, crimi-
nal prosecutions against the persons involved, should sat-
isfy this Court that he did not seek to gain or take advan-
tage of the false testimony but only to minimize its harm-
ful effects. 
Petitioner has reviewed all of the cases which he has 
been able to find concerning disciplinary action of mem-
bers of the Bar before this Court. In many of the cases 
read it would appear that the punishment decreed to the 
offending member of the Bar was less severe than that 
which the Court has ordered in this case. 
The following is a list of the cases, together with the 
punishment decreed: 
hz re Era1zs & Rogers, 22 U. 366, 6 P. 913. 
See Also: In Re Erans, 42 U. 282, 130 P. 217. 
Evans & Rogers \Yere accused of champerty and fail-
ing to deliver to their clients funds which they had re-
20 
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ceived and to which he was entitled. The Utah Supreme 
Court disbarred said attorneys but in a later opinion 
rendered many years later the disbarment was set aside 
and the Court acknowledged that a great miscarriage of 
justice had been perpetrated. As in the case at bar the 
disbarment arose out of a heated lawsuit and one in 
which disagreement between counsel representing the 
various parties seemed to be the basic seed which caused 
the complaint and proceeding against Evans & Rogers. 
In rc Foxley, 61 U. 575, 217 P. 248. The attorney was 
convicted of embezzlement. This Court ordered dis-
barment. 
In re Hilton, 48 U. 172, 158 P. 691. Hilton was con-
victed of falsely stating, both publicly and privately, that 
the Utah Supreme Court was under the control and in-
fluence of the Mormon Church and was ordered 
disbarred. 
In re Hanson, 48 U. 163, 158 P. 778. This proceed-
ing involved Attorney Willard Hanson. He was caught 
by the Police Department of Salt Lake City while taking 
certain clothing from the department belonging to the de-
fendant whom he represented and who was charged with 
the crime of murder. It appeared that the Court believed 
the Attorney had taken the clothing for the purpose of de-
stroying them or concealing them from the State's prose-
cuting authority. Discipline ordered was sixty days' sus-
pension to run from the 1st day of July to the 31st day 
of August. 
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In re Barclay, 82 U. 288, 24 P. 2d 302, Barclay was 
accused of withholding funds belonging to his client. The 
Bar recommended six months' suspension. This Court re-
duced it to three months upon a showing that during the 
proceedings Barclay had restored to his client the moneys 
which he was accused of withholding. 
In re Stephenson, 85 U. 380, 39 P. 2d 722. Stephen-
son was accused of withholding funds collected on behalf 
of his client, and was ordered that he be suspended from 
practive for a period of three months. 
In re McCullough, 97 U. 533,95 P. 2d 13. ~IcCullough 
was accused of soliciting legal actions and withholding 
information concerning the whereabouts of a defendant 
who was released to his custody and whom he advised to 
leave the State of Utah to escape prosecution. Recom-
mended punishment two years' suspension was reduced 
by this Court to nine months' suspension. 
In re Pearce, 103 U. 522, 137 P. 2d 969. Pearce was 
convicted of an indictable misdemeanor involving a con-
spiring to operate houses of ill fame. On the basis of this 
conviction he was disbarred. 
In re Norton, 106 U. 179, 146 P. 2d 899. Norton false-
ly represented to this Court that a certain offered Exhibit 
had been rPrPived by the trial court when, in fact, it had 
not been received but had been rejected. The Court, one 
discovers from the opinion, believed not only that Norton 
falsely represented the status of Exhibit I, but also that 
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the Exhibit sheets in the case had been altered to show 
the receipt of the exhibit and that the alterations were 
probably accomplished by Norton. Ordered one year sus-
pension. 
The evidence in this case shows petitioner was only 
guilty of failing to reveal false statements concerning im-
material matters during the time the opposing party was 
presenting his case. This Court has determined this vio-
lates professional ethics. The violation, it is respectfully 
submtted, was an innocent mistake made because the peti-
tioner erroneously believed he owed a duty to his client 
to wait for an opportune time before making a disclosure 
to the Court or correcting the record. Punishment cer-
tainly should not approach that given for wrongfully 
appropriating clients' funds or attempting to destroy 
State's evidence in a murder case. 
The Court should further consider the fact that the 
matter complained of occurred in June 1954. Since Au-
gust 6, 1954, when the complainant Sherman wrote to the 
Utah State Bar lodging a "formal complaint," petitioner 
has been under investigation and subjected to consider-
able mental pressure, as well as adverse publicity. The 
stigma attached to such proceedings, as well as to the 
Order of the Court finding petitioner to be guilty of un-
professional conduct, has been and is sufficient, under the 
facts and circumstances of this case, to satisfy the Court 
that the ends of justice have been accomplished. 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioner respectfully submits that the Court should 
grant a rehearing for the purpose of reviewing and con-
sidering the matters raise dherein, or at all events the 
Order in respect to the punishment should be amended so 
as to eliminate any suspension or reduce the time thereof. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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